

Peddlers of Crisis

To Dan and Patricia,
for your
enthusiastic support

Jerry Sanavos

October, 1983

1/18/16 1:49 PM

THOUGHTS: from Peddlers of Crisis

[Why was I so trusted, respected, listened to, by the hard-line Cold Warriors? Because I was a thorough anti-Communist. (Berlin Blockade, Berlin, American ideals vs. Bolshevik tyranny...) (My readiness to believe, mistakenly, that the Soviets intended world domination, by subversion, misled revolutionary impulses; and by military threat, if not conquest).

[Note that hst and Byrnes first aimed, with A-bomb, at "roll-back" in East Europe; as Churchill put it, "You do this, or else..."). This flatly failed.

And attempt at roll-back in Korea, after Inchon, also failed. MacArthur proposals to roll back in Korea and China through nuclear forces (Chinats in China backed by nuclear weapons?) were rejected. From then on (?) nuclear weapons were used to preserve, maintain, protect, US hegemony, "defending" indirect/informal/covert empire, not expanding it or defending the US itself.]

1949: p. 12; Russian breaking atomic monopoly meant that "atomic diplomacy was destined for a shortened career unless the nuclear ante was raised to still higher levels of destruction."

[But the move to H-bomb meant also the end of US immunity! SU H-bomb warheads for ICBMs! (And already, the SU a-bombs, tactical weapons, meant annihilation in nuclear war for Europe; with the same, eventually, for the US, with SU ICBM tests in 1957. So, from ALMOST the very time that NATO was founded—Type II deterrence, with reliance on nucs from about 1952, it was a "suicide bomber's" strategy. UNLIKE STRATEGIC BOMBING IN WWII. UNLIKE SAC PLANS IN 1945-48.

Yet the strategy/policy simply didn't change, either when it was suicidal for Europe or suicidal for the US as well. Hence, I suppose, I shouldn't have been surprised when nuclear winter didn't really change it in 1983, either: the prospect of omnicide, rather than simply mutual suicide in the northern hemisphere (or earlier, of the NATO alliance and Warsaw Pact, Eurasia). Always, "just a threat" (largely for political/economic purposes), i.e., a (small) risk. Acceptable. Even, "morally acceptable" (problematically, when the Greater Evil was not, really, military expansion by the SU).

267 [If Carter had tried to enlist a popular base—possible after VN/N—against militarism, as he seemed privately to want to do (see his campaign pledges, and initial proposals to JCS and even to SU)—that would raised opposition to empire as well. For what reason empire if not to defend against SU? , SU threat was needed for US hegemony in Europe and in TW. Managerialists of empire, like Trilaterals (Carter: but also, in particular, Brz) wanted less emphasis on military means (did Brz?) but also empire; international economics plan to shift division of labor, shifting older sectors of industrial manufacturing to South from North.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

On beginning of Sanders:

--Note that both CW I and CW II --arms buildups—began with totally fraudulent descriptions/estimates of the “Soviet threat” (including, in II, SU buildup in Seventies), to justify the US arms buildup and the tone of danger, promoted by CPD-I and CPD-II (both led by Nitze). Same is true of CW III, now! P. 14

Will Trump, as president, call for a big arms buildup, for “strength” and “winning”?
Will Hillary?

Under GWB, GWOT (global war on terror) has taken the place of the Soviet Threat: more specifically, (“fundamentalist, extreme”) Islam has taken that place: though Putin is being groomed for demonization as well.

17/ Loss of Iran in early 1979 plays same role for CPD-II as “loss of China” plays in latter half of hst’s term after 1948 of CPD-I (with Establishment backing, then):. quadrupling of defense budget (from low level) . (CPD-II stays active, though, into Reagan years even as many of its members join Reagan administration, just as CPD-I members joined Ike (having served under Truman), but then I disbanded in 1953.

(Sanders sees II as having evoked a Freeze movement under Reagan—thinks a Great Debate is coming (in 1983); however, this fizzled; and was overtaken by Reagan “success” with end of CW-II.

[As a commentator on Reich’s support for Sanders notes today, Sanders could fund his programs, like single-payer, without tax increases (only?) by converting resources from the military budget!

April 6, 1982: Haig defends “first use” of nucs against call for NFU by McNamara, Bundy, Smith and Kennan. P. 20

20. Nitze’s “correlation of forces” states “that the outcome of international politics is determined by the perception of power between East and West, measured by a calculus that includes economic, political, psychological, and military factors in its formula.”

NSC-68 aimed not at (Kennan’s) “containment (opposing not communist regimes per se but at their expansion, and primarily by political/economic means, not military) but, literally, at “roll-back” and weakening of these regimes even in USSR (as now?!) ()But note that mere possession of nucs had not, as Truman, Byrnes, Churchill had hoped, kept SU from consolidating hold on East Europe, nor had prevented Communist control of China. (Was Kennan arguing against possible use

of nucs in China: FU not against attack on US territory, which he thought was sole acceptable use?)

27-28: When I first read NSC-68, I was more struck by its emphasis on increasing **both** conventional and nuclear strength (vs. the Ike emphasis only on FU/FS, main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons), rather than its rejection of Kennan's strong argument in favor of NFU.

Recommended increase from then \$13B to 35-50B. (Kennan had recommended staying with \$13B.) resigning in summer 1949. (But see his memos in favor of NFU in Feb. 1950.

Note that NSC-68 was calling for a three-to-four-fold increase in military spending in the absence of any attack on US or its allies! (Before Korea). As in 1983!

Bohlen and Kennan, the two Soviet experts, both challenged the "aim of world domination" theme (which is the explicit assumption of the CPD-II and Reagan themes!) (RAND?)³²

[Who has noted? "Present danger" comes from "clear and present danger": SC conditions for restrictions on First Amendment protections of speech, press and assembly."

anti-war protests during World War I gave rise to several important free speech cases related to sedition and inciting violence. In the 1919 case Schenck v. United States the Supreme Court held that an anti-war activist did not have a First Amendment right to advocate draft resistance.^{[3][4]} In his majority opinion, Justice Holmes introduced the clear and present danger test, which would become an important concept in First Amendment law; but the *Schenck* decision did not formally adopt the test.^[3] Holmes later wrote that he intended the clear and present danger test to refine, not replace, the bad tendency test.^{[5][6]} Although sometimes mentioned in subsequent rulings, the clear and present danger test was never endorsed by the Supreme Court as a test to be used by lower courts when evaluating the constitutionality of legislation that regulated speech.^{[7][8]}

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Committee_on_the_Present_Danger

he **Committee on the Present Danger** (CPD) is a hawkish "advocacy organization" first founded in 1950 and re-formed in 1976 to push for larger defense budgets and arms buildups, to counter the Soviet Union. In June 2004, *The Hill* reported that a third incarnation of CPD was being planned, to address the War on terrorism. The head of the 2004 CPD, PR pro and former Reagan adviser Peter Hannaford, explained, "we saw a parallel" between the Soviet threat and the threat from terrorism. The message that CPD will convey through lobbying, media work and conferences is that "the war on terror needs to be won," he said. ^[1]

Members of the 2004 CPD include Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, former CIA director R. James Woolsey, Jr., and Reagan administration official and 1976 Committee founder Max M. Kampelman.^[2] At the July

20 launching of the 2004 CPD, Lieberman and Senator [Jon Kyl](#) were identified as the honorary co-chairs. [3] Other notable members listed on the CPD website include [Laurie Mylroie](#), [Norman Podhoretz](#), [Frank Gaffney](#) and other associates of the [American Enterprise Institute](#), [Heritage Foundation](#), [American Israel Public Affairs Committee](#) and the [Boeing Company](#). [4]

One day after the launch of the 2004 CPD, managing director [Peter Hannaford](#) resigned after it was reported that Hannaford, while working for his PR firm the [Carmen Group](#), has lobbied on behalf of Austria's Freedom Party, which is headed by right-wing nationalist [Joerg Haider](#). Haider has been quoted as commending the "orderly employment policy" of the Nazi Third Reich government and paid a "solidarity visit" to Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein in 2002. Some CPD members defended Hannaford; [Midge Decter](#) said, "I first came to know him because he was a right-hand man of [Ronald Reagan](#). I cannot imagine Pete Hannaford is anything but a firm and solid lover of democracy." [5]

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History: 1950s

The CPD, according to the *PublicEye.org* website (last updated July 1989), was originally "formed in 1950 by top eastern establishment luminaries. It was designed as a 'citizen's lobby' to alert the nation to the Soviet 'present danger,' and the resultant need to adopt the NSC-68 agenda in order to survive. NSC-68 was a top secret [National Security Council](#) document written by [Paul H. Nitze](#) promoting a huge military build-up for the purpose of rolling back communist influence and attaining and maintaining U.S. military supremacy in the world. In 1951 the CPD launched a three-month scare campaign over the NBC network. Every Sunday night thereafter the group used the Mutual Broadcasting System to talk to the nation about the 'present danger' and the need to take action. As a result of efforts such as these both in and out of government, the recommendations of NSC-68 were adopted. President [Harry S. Truman](#) adopted a policy of containment militarism and the military budget escalated even more than the targeted factor of three times. The [Cold War](#) and an era of interventionist policies became a political reality in the United States." [6]

History: 1970s

"The post Vietnam era, however, saw the reemergence in the American public of anti-interventionist sentiment. In Congress, new policies of detente and arms control reflected a more conciliatory attitude toward East-West relations. Such trends were anathema to the CPD's bipolar view of the world. Led once again by [Eugene V. Rostow](#) and Nitze, members of the CPD regrouped for action.

"The revitalization of the CPD grew out of an independent group called [Team B](#). Team B was authorized in 1976 by President [Gerald R. Ford](#) and organized by then-CIA chief, [George Herbert Walker Bush](#). The purpose of Team B was to develop an independent judgment of Soviet capabilities and intentions. Team B was headed by [Richard Pipes](#) and included Paul Nitze, [Foy Kohler](#), [William R. Van Cleave](#), Lt. Gen. [Daniel O. Graham](#) (ret.), [Thomas Wolf](#) of [RAND Corporation](#) and Gen. [John Vogt, Jr.](#) (ret.). Also a part of

Team B were five officials still active in government: Maj. Gen. George Keegan, Brig. Gen. Jasper Welch, Paul Dundes Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Seymour Weiss of the State Department. Team B was housed in the offices of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority.

"The political base for CPD II was in the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a group formed in 1972 by the hard-line, anti-Soviet wing of the Senate, led by Sen. Henry M. Scoop Jackson. These conservative Democrats contended that communism was a great evil and that the U.S. had a moral obligation to eradicate it and foster democracy throughout the world. The 193 individual members of the revitalized CPD comprise a who's who of the Democratic Party establishment and a cross-section of Republican leadership. Eventually, 13 of the 18 members of the Foreign Policy Task Force of the CDM, lead by Eugene V. Rostow, joined the CPD. Notable among them were Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Leon Keyserling, Max M. Kampelman, Richard Shifter, and John P. Roche.

"CPD II is a nonprofit organization established to 'facilitate a national discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the U.S. directed towards a secure peace and freedom.' CPD II broadened its base considerably from the original group by including in its ranks top labor officials, Jewish liberals and neo-conservative intellectuals. It managed this feat by including in its ideology not only a strong anti-Soviet policy, but also one which promoted growth and expansion. These members donate their time to the organization. The CPD presented an alternative to the cooperative vision of empire put forth by the Trilateralists with an imperial, unilateral philosophy of power retention through military strength. President James Earl Carter, Jr. chose to follow the philosophy of the Trilaterals, but the CPD and its cohorts became dominant with the election of Ronald Reagan. (See Trilateral Commission.)

"Other proponents of the CPD position include the American Security Council (ASC), the ASC's Congressional lobby group--the National Coalition for Peace through Strength."

"Advocate of nuclear superiority, the CPD helped to create the myth of U.S. nuclear inferiority and the concept of 'windows of vulnerability.' CPD has expressed longstanding opposition to all types of arms control. Founding member William R. Van Cleave said, 'Arms control has had a depressant effect not only on our military programs but also on our ability to deal with the Soviets. It has thoroughly muddled our thinking.'"

"Think tank representatives on the original board of directors included Donald G. Brennan, director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Indiana; George Tanham, vice president and trustee of the RAND Corporation; Glenn Campbell, director of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University; Harris Huntington, trustee at the Brookings Institution; Ray Cline, director of the Center for Strategic and Intl Studies; and J. C. Hurewitz, director of Columbia's Middle East Institute.

Funding: "The start-up grant for CPD-II came from David Packard of Hewlett-Packard. In 1984, the \$300,000 budget came from 1,100 contributors, with a limit of \$10,000 per year per source. Grants given by Richard Mellon Scaife (Gulf Oil) from the Carthage Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Trust of the Grandchildren of Sarah Mellon Scaife to CPD between 1973 and 1981 total \$300,000."

Note: See original article for footnoted material, as well as other extensive information on CPD.

Donald H. Rumsfeld "was a founding member of the **Committee on the Present Danger**, which effectively undermined President Jimmy Carter's arms control policies. He was the first major advocate of the MX missile, and he was a moving force behind the Republican right's Commission to Assess the

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, which rejected the CIA's more moderate 1995 estimate of the ABM threat." [7]

In his April 2000 article "Lest We Forget: Neo-conservatives and Republican Foreign Policy, 1976-2000," Alex Zaitchik, who "researches security policy at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Czech Republic," and who is also an editor at *Freezerbox.com*, prophetically wrote:

"Most of the super-hawks that populated Ronald Reagan's cabinet were culled from the ranks of the advocacy group **Committee on the Present Danger**. The Committee, formed in 1976, was organized by fanatically anti-communist neo-conservatives with little patience for the give-and-take of Richard M. Nixon/Jimmy Carter diplomacy. Once viewed as extremists with minimal influence on policy debates, Reagan's victory brought the Committee to the center of power, the reigns of policy delivered into its lap. The arms control process was hijacked, beheaded and left to rot besides the discarded corpse of détente.

"Once in power, these men geared US policy toward forcing the Soviets to accept US strategic superiority, if not humiliating defeat. Outraged by the fact of Soviet nuclear parity as enshrined in the ABM accord of 1972, they sought to move beyond the stabilizing strictures of Mutual Assured Destruction into a brave new world of effective first-strikes and laser defenses. In a series of extremely destabilizing public statements, they described nukes as effective offensive weapons. Rather than seeing the Soviet build-up of the 1970s as a rational and belated response to the American build up of the 1960s, they argued that the Soviets were preparing to use nuclear blackmail against the US and takeover the world. That this was roundly rejected as absurd by nearly every major academic and foreign policy analyst had little effect on Reagan's Defense and State Departments, where closed system intellectual incestuousness and a religious intensity kept everyone happily immune to rational criticism.

"In retrospect, given the scale of recklessness in the policies and statements of the first Reagan Administration--from medium-range missiles in Europe to civil defense to Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to 'winnable nuclear war'--it is remarkable that disaster was avoided. During the early 1980s, US leaders sounded less like educated and serious men with the fate of the earth in their palms than did General Buck Turgidson of Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove*: 'I'm not saying we won't get our hair muffed. Ten to twenty million casualties tops--depending on the breaks.'

"The full story makes for fascinating history. Unfortunately it is a history we may be doomed to repeat.

"The crusading--what one might call 'madman'--school of right-wing foreign policy did not die with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite something of a drift in Republican strategy in the post-Cold War period, hawkish instincts remain alive and well at the heart of the Party in 2000. Reincarnated in a new generation of neo-conservatives these instincts are reasserting themselves amidst George Walker Bush's drive to the White House. Hints of what would be found in a GOP executive are currently on display in Congress.

"Along with pushing for a multi-billion dollar national missile defense system, the GOP is seeking budget cuts that would eliminate funding for the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons. They are also urging the abandonment of a project to construct detection sensors crucial to the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Republican dominated Senate rejected the Test Ban, of course, a move that more thoughtful conservatives have described as 'gratuitously blunt.'

"Not far from Capitol Hill, neo-conservative strategists are currently pushing to make foreign policy a front-burner issue again, and the scripted ideas being put forward by Bush on the trail manifest a disturbing nostalgia for the brashness and imagined simplicity of the Reagan era. Many prominent neo-conservatives clearly yearn for the good old days, when imagined 'windows of vulnerability' won them the White House and *The Day After* was on the tube. 'Assertive internationalism' and 'Robust Nationalism' are the hot keywords of the new old thinking. Needless to say, arms control does not fit into the future being projected.

For it is a future of absolute American technological mastery, and no artificial limits on the national megatonnage will be tolerated.

"Infused with the righteousness of the true believer, neo-conservatives are terrifyingly fanciful when it comes to international affairs. Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two neo-con architects of GOP policy, recently penned an essay in the conservative *National Review* entitled 'The Present Danger' in which they explicitly held up the Cold War era Reagan model as appropriate for the next president. While the authors admit that the new Present Danger is not incarnate in any adversary--'it has no name'--they nonetheless recommend that the US spend an extra \$60-100 billion per year above current defense budgets to combat it. This money would be devoted to enhancing America's ability to project force abroad and the pursuance of 'regime change,' i.e., the invasion of foreign countries and the overthrow of leaders unpalatable to Mr. Kagan and Mr. Kristol. Flagrant disregard for international law and arms racing is to make the world safe for democracy--again.

"The flagship neo-con journal, the *Weekly Standard*, offers an analysis of the present international scene that can only be described as paranoid delusional, claiming in a recent editorial that 'it's hard to think of a time when America's international standing has been so low, when Washington's credibility was in such disrepair.' The piece goes on to compare Bill Clinton's foreign policy 'drift' to Carter's 'weakness'; the implication being that what America needs is another maniacal spread-eagle cowboy like Ronald Reagan. There's no Soviet bogeymen to rally behind and no charismatic leader this time around, but apparently certain unnamed mortal threats and Bush Jr. will have to do. We are surrounded and our freedom in grave peril, and apparently only *The Weekly Standard* has the vantage point needed to see this.

"Connections between propagandists for the new Present Danger and the original Committee of the 1970s are not limited to nostalgia and borrowed catchphrases. A list of current advisors to George W. Bush reveals former members of the old Committee, most notably Richard Perle, who served as Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense. Along with Harvard Sovietologist Richard Pipes, Perle was the most vocal proponent of 'winnable nuclear war' in Reagan's first Administration. Known as a hawk's hawk, he once famously described the European peace movement as an expression of mere 'protestant angst.' The millions that marched against US policy weren't really worried about getting fried in a nuclear war, you see, they were just reading too much Kierkegaard.

"That Richard Perle, an advocate of nuclear superiority and manageable nuclear exchange, is one election away from getting his corner office at the Pentagon back doesn't only worry liberals. Republicans of a less ideological bent fear that the neo-conservatives will pull a Bush White House in an extremist direction, thus keeping responsible voices away from policy formation. Moderate 'realists' like Alexander Haig either resigned or were forced out of the cold war circus of the 1980s for lack of passion, and the silencing of rational perspectives could again occur in a Bush Administration dominated by neo-conservative thinking.

"Such worries have led Gideon Rose of the Council on Foreign Relations to doubt that the Republicans are ready to 'exercise power responsibly.' He sees recent statements by influential neo-conservative strategists as 'cause for alarm' and says that their eerily familiar ideological passion 'remains constant and dangerous.' Mr. Rose is no dove, and for him to caution that the current constellation of forces in the GOP is incapable of producing a foreign policy of mature adults should stop us in our tracks.

"The lessons of 1980 are loud and they are clear. Militarists and loose cannons can capture the White House and hold the world hostage."

[Madmen in authority]

Thursday, January 28, 2016

See morning notes.

Note how extraordinary was the notion of tripling or quadrupling the defense budget! And achieving it! (How did the relation to the overall budget, and GNP, remain over the years?)

At a time when there was no overseas crisis! Or prospect of one! (What would have happened, in the US and the world, without the Kim/Stalin/Mao decision to invade Korea? (And to hst campaign in 1952, or Stevenson? Would Ike have run, or Taft?)

9-9-50: Substantial US troops to Europe! Europe! And why? Marshall becomes SecDef. Lovett as DepSecDef. Triumph of Acheson-Nitze line on nat. sec. Three months after outbreak of Korea (before Inchon) and nearly six months after NSC-68 submitted. (June 25 attack; Huntington wrongly says budget was decided then; believed imminent general war with SU. ?) In July, hst asks for 10.6 B increase in budget (supplemental!), 6B for Europe. (Near-doubling? Well, from 13MB

New: permanent remilitarization, and commitment to Europe. (Not logically demanded by Korea!) WHAT IF CHINESE HAD NOT COME IN?

54 "Four dramatic days in December, 1950 (after Chinese entry in Korea two weeks earlier

(my junior year; I get engaged at Yale game; (propose in January, expecting to go to Korea in June); Chinese attack, Fox Hill, Chosin Reservoir; I'm still in labor economics; Conant had been my freshman sector teacher, recognized me; He had advised hitting Hiroshima in 1946, opposed H-bomb in 1949, Dec.; accepted to be head of CPD in spring of 1950; announced as head... I'm Pegasus? At Advocate; about to be president; on Crimson ed board;

Dec. 12: Conant and Bush (MP-I!) and Voorhees (all Republicans; Lovett too?) announce CPD: "Present danger...the aggressive designs of the SU." (LIE) (ANY basis for this?!) Need for rearmament of Europe...troops, aid, materiel. UMT (My debate topic in spring 1947 or 1948?) (I was on pro side, because I didn't believe in it!) German rearmament. NYT: SU pressing Korea to divert US from "key struggle in Western Europe." (What?)

Dec. 13: hst asks Cong leadership for more funds, warns "the possibility of war with the SU has never been greater." (!) (Probability?)

Dec. 14: hst submits budget, fourth supplement to FY 51, designated NSC-68/4 in Admin. "declaration of national emergency." (= what? COG? The first? Ending when?)

Dec. 15: radio address, hst: "Our homes, our nation, all the things we believe in are in great danger. This danger has been created by the rulers of the Soviet Union." He went on to explain that while actual warfare had erupted in Korea, "Europe and the rest of the world are also in great danger." In "meeting the present danger" US forces would be increased to 3.5 million men (proposed by CPD) ...

Dec. 20: Ike named as SACEUR. Military spending for FY 51 is \$48.2B, originally \$13.5 (over triple, almost quadruple). Integrated European defense force: Ike leadership and large contingent of US troops.

Hoover proposes instead, "a Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western Civilization," holding oceans with air and sea power, waiting for Europe to demonstrate a united will to fight. Taft in Senate questions Truman's legal right to commit ground troops to Europe without Congressional approval. Moreover...he did not see any conclusive evidence that "the Russians intend military to attack free Europe." (sending troops would only provoke the Soviets. "One of the greatest present dangers to peace is the conduct of the USG itself, and specifically the prospective formation of a European Army under the command of an American, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.." would bring deficits (?) and inflation (?) and a garrison state. (Repubs, "isolationists" keep warning of these, bankrupting America, by potential "traitors." "internationalists" (Europe-firsters) (Imperialists/Anglo-US)

Same themes that had brought large numbers of Repubs to Congress in election, 1950: narrowing Dem majority in the Senate to two votes, 49-47. (House?)

[to JS: If Kennan didn't have a military response in mind for containment, what did he have in mind? Covert action? Propaganda?)

Acheson drive (61) for troops to Europe to reassure as to US commitment (to DM?! Tripwire to DM!) Europe awaiting evidence of US commitment to remilitarization, US waiting (Johnson) for evidence of European "will."

In August. with Voorhees and Cutter, Conant proposes approach of a decade earlier(!) (as Repubs charge!) "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Conant agrees to head: CPD born.

Large standing army; UMT; hundreds of thousands of US troops in Europe. "Without these" Europeans feared a SU and East Europe counter-reaction to their rearmament (of

Germany!), big war. "Among foreign policy elite there was the concern that the Europeans might choose neutralism as a more attractive alternative than the risk of war with the SU." 62. [What would that mean for US, empire?] What would "neutralism" mean?

"To guard against such an event [NOT WAR! NEUTRALISM!] the shield of American troops seemed to be the only preventive mechanism [above] in the face of the vanishing nuclear monopoly." 62

[AHA! Without nuclear monopoly (as of Sept. 1949), there was no basis for a "rational" FU/FS "defense" of Europe by nucs. Therefore, a non-rational basis was needed; a "tripwire" of Americans, armed with nucs, and American bases (targets for SU attack, necessarily) in Europe, to guarantee (or make sufficiently likely) a US nuclear response (not a German one).

Madman strategy: not "mad" beliefs (though HAK proposes for LNW, limited nuclear war in Europe, Oppenheimer, Teller, (together on this?!) Gavin, etc.) or aggressive aims, but non-rational defensive response by US troops and US president and JCS to defend US troops (not Europeans! Who would be sacrificed!).

A DM with a human tripwire (not a computerized, automatic response, like HK's: but a human/nationalistic American response to attack on Americans, plus delegation, and de facto delegation: as K had installed in Cuba, if only he had been willing to announce it, as we did in Europe!

Thus we could accomplish German rearmament—for economic and political reasons, not "defense"—without provoking a SU attack! Because they would have to attack Americans with nucs, and American bases. (Bases remain as tripwire even when AJW/RAND/SAC get main striking force moved to US ZI).

If there were potential SU offensive designs on Europe, they were about to be provoked by US plans for rearmament of Germany. (Would SU have cared that much about rearmament of Europe without Germany?)

Bowie and others, enthusiastic about Conant's desire to expand draft (rather than his earlier pushing for UMT, militia training—what the hell was that about?!), concern was about "European 'will'", not SU attack. Will for what? Rearmament? Well, what was that for? PDS: to keep Germany in US arms, rebuild Europe (with money from Congress). Bowie: most of the people did not want to be "liberated." ? Meaning what? 63 "**Present danger** from Russia creates a unique **opportunity**" to "unite Europe."

McCloy, High Commissioner to Germany (banker): fear of "neutralism." Germany and France are "hedging" (?) Need US troops to show we intend to "fight" there. (I.e., blow up Eurasia, if "necessary" or provoked.

Heads of universities all enlisted in campaign for 3.5 million troops, a million in Europe (!), draft: (Ass-holes...) Think about it: a draft for..Korea! (Like draft in Australia for VN! Or the US, for that matter! Like draft for WWI!)

See 65, Ike and Conant to elites.

[ALL THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF NO SU THREAT TO WEST EUROPE, OR ANYWHERE! TOTAL BULLSHIT! (Berlin blockade over in 1949. Italian elections over. French “danger” passed? Yes, Chinese victory: so? (Marshal and Acheson were the ones who had written that off as inevitable. What was Republican strategy to avoid that: nucs? French about to lose in VN: so?)

[Noteworthy that when PNAC is nostalgic for a “Pearl Harbor” in 1998 (?)—to take over ME—they don’t refer to “Korea,” or “Chinese entry,” let alone to “Tonkin Gulf.” All real precedents, for 9-11.] (Or “Berlin blockade,” or “Cuban missile crisis: or do they?)

[So in 1950, Repubs were warring with “internationalists”; in 1980, neo-cons had become “militarist internationalists” vs. (Dem) trilateralists (also bankers, , including HAK, no?): they had been converted from “isolationism” by Cold War (and opposition to VN, among elites).

[WHY was Conant, et al, so set on universal military service, a million in Europe, when even Marshall was doubtful?] 67 “Educators”! What the fuck? CFR (Republicans); Assoc. of American Universities (Wriston);

CPD/CFR: Big business (banks, lawyers, oil?) of the Eastern wing of Republican party. (Also scientific/technological elite). Had come together in summer of 1940. (June 19, Stimson (Wall St. lawyer) , Sec of War for FDR, Patterson (Wall St. lawyer) as assistant. McCloy, Harvey Bundy, Lovett. Barnet: origin of foreign policy establishment. CFR. TR world view. (honor, struggle, glory)

JS refers to Hiroshima as “monstrous” decision, war’s “victorious if ignominious conclusion.” 76

[Hyp: CPD-I represented Republican left wing (“internationalists/imperialists”); CPD-II (still Nitze) represented Republican right wing! (HAK/Rockefeller/Trilateralists now being Republican left wing, with Nitze and neo-cons (former Dems) having been converted to be right-wing Republicans (still militarists: the Republican right-wing was now militaristic imperialists, as Nitze had been before.

CPD-I were Repubs who served FDR and hst, eastern Establishment bankers and lawyers and oilmen (international: not Texas?) . (So, Conant was a Republican!) They then were opposed by Congressional Republicans, isolationists, “right.”(Asia-first imperialists. Farmers? Small business, domestic business. Anti-tax, anti-gov spending, anti-Keynes.

This was not the CW policy of 1947-48 (Truman doctrine, Marshall Plan), but the CW struggle of 1950-51, looking toward European Rearmament, Europe-first despite Korea. Repubs needed to sell a Dem/hst policy (Acheson, Nitze,...).

Win, don’t lose, in Asia: requires nucs!: China, (Indochina? Help French with nucs?!) Korea: nucs (McArthur). (actual fighting going on, unlike Europe! Where there was no real threat! Except to Berlin: defended with nucs). So what were US troops for? As Tripwire to nucs: to “reassure” Europeans—that it was **safe to rearm Germany and other Europeans**, in interests of US-Europe economic ties.

Also, concern for who would succeed Truman: if Taft, they lose! (Stevenson attitude?) 88 (See last years of Carter! Hst has adopted Containment Militarism, SOTU 1951, but who next? CPD-I manages the Truman transition; CPD-II replaces Carter with Reagan (has had transformed Carter, anyway. Does ELK oppose these policies, in early 1980? Weakens Carter; as does hostage crisis, raid failure, no second raid, October surprise...)

Truman SOTU: “the aggression in Korea is part of the Russian Communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step.” 88. If Western Europe “were to fall to Soviet Russia...” Econ aid must be continued, to the building of their defenses...

[This was as realistic a picture of the threat as the “window of vulnerability,” CPD-II, in 1974-76-80...Carter’s “unilateral disarmament,” Soviet “superiority,” blackmail, FS... (But just as there was a fear in Europe that rearmament might actually provoke SU invasion—any realism to this? Well, it wasn’t tested, US did commit troops...Reagan rearmament DID cause Andropov both to fear and to consider general war! Despite US tripwires!]

CPD: 89 “Europe “is the next prize Russia seeks,” and this would mean the “absorption of 200,000000 people, many of them highly industrialized, in to the Communist empir98e against us.” (As warned by HK in 1960, RAND...)—like CPD, again Nitze...

Repubs (Wherry) opposed troops to Europe without Senate decision just as Taft had opposed **constitutionality** of hst sending troops to Korea! (though not to “war” as they claimed: to “deterrence”/no-war. Trip-wire!) (Like our navy at Pearl Harbor, or B-17s in Philippines! As AJW feared.

Conant: “The United States is in danger. The danger is clearly of a military nature...we must take immediate steps to meet the national danger...We have no time to lose.” Universal military service. Feb. 7, 1951 [I get married on Feb. 10, expecting to “serve” — but in Korea!—by end of school year, if not earlier.] (no draft test) Six divisions in Europe. 200,000

Serve “as long as the announced threat of aggression remains in the world.” (Aggression in ...China! Indochina! Korea! (yes, but: Soviet aggression?! They no longer worried this was a trial run for Europe!)

But Hoover is warning of involvement of Americans in a “hopeless land war in Europe.” (NOT really what Estab has in mind, esp. Ike! Tripwire! And Hoover fear is not realized. Hearings in Jan. on drafting 18-year-olds. (I was 19, going on 20 in April). (See Carter’s renewing registration in 1980, over Afghanistan and Persian Gulf, RDF; but no draft afterwards

Bush on March 4: while the atom bomb had been a sufficient deterrent in past, the US could no longer count on strategic bombing as the only means of “inhibiting Soviet aggression.” Only a combination of ground forces and continued development of atomic weapons [Teller-Ulam discovery February, memo March 9; big meeting June 19] could avert the Communist advance. (Ground troops to make it a thick tripwire, not subject to false alarm). Military stalemate was possible only with “US superiority.” [unless “mad”; and only if mad, superior or not! Because rational initiative of nuc war was impossible even if SU were “inferior”! Of course, if the US THOUGHT/PRETENDED it was superior, it was more plausible that they would entrust deterrence to a tripwire to what was really a DM (but US might not realize it! As, “doubting” nuc winter. Or believing in D-M by SAC: rather than relying on US tac nucs, automatic.)93

Patterson: need to protect manganese (where?) and keep Russians from control of the oil of the ME and uranium in Africa.

98. Asia-first: Korea could be “won” only the way Europe could be defended from Sovs: by nucs (only, not the threat but the attacks: MacArthur). MacArthur drive to unify Korea is a provocation to Chinese Communists: just the way that some feared rearmament of Germany might provoke Soviets. (What if nucs had been used immediately against Chinese?) **(Why, after all, weren’t they used? Atlee concern? SU deterrence? Why was Atlee so concerned?)** Or the way that Mongoose provoked K into Cuba.

Su bomb: Stalin OK’s move into Korea. SU ICBM: K makes ultimatum on Berlin. (Nitze not entirely wrong about “appearance” encouraging foes, discouraging allies).

“Mutual security”/offshore procurement solves dollar gap.¹¹³ mood of impending crisis; \$8.5B in foreign aid “to resist Soviet aggression.” (where?) Control of Europe. **Containment** of European independence. (As, in Third World TW, containment of leftists/nationalists/social democrats/welfare policies/unions: not of slipping into soviet bloc).

Containment militarism: zero-sum global politics (no “neutralism,” “coalitions”—hence, leftist regimes, nationalist regimes prone to “ignoring threat of com takeover” (DomRep, Guatemala, Iran, Brazil, Chile, VN) “and conviction that military force was deciding factor.”

[Military force? Or **appearance**: of the likelihood (not, rationality) that ‘provocation/challenge’ of US forces would trigger the US Doomsday Machine (DM)?

Nixon’s “madman strategy”: supposedly based on his “mad anti-communism.” (how much did Hanoi fear this? As much as they should have?)

To win Republican support for European rearmament, Truman had to announce a global anti-communist policy that allowed for containing (or rolling back) communism in Asia as well, which repubs were more supportive of. Thus (after “losing China”) they had to defend both in Korea and Indochina. Latter, to support French support for German rearmament. 121

Ike rejects US armed involvement in DBP (after offering nucs), but keeps US in VN, Diem. VN becomes a vital interest: in maintaining myth of global Com threat.

In all its incarnations, the CPDs (and their equivalent in 1958-60, Gaither/RAND/Rockefeller) oppose “détente,” any weakening in perceived “Soviet communist military threat” and need for military preparedness in response, arms spending (including SAC). Thus Dems/Repubs hawks support Truman’s CW stance (which he attributes largely to Acheson and Nitze, Lovett, Conant); then (after

supporting Ike victory), oppose Ike's "passivity" about "threat" in face of SU "superiority" (ICBM) (why did Gaither really go for huge CD program? CW ideology?); (N was really part of this! Potential CPD-II, had to back off because of leak. Against Ike's anti-Keynesianism, fiscal conservatism. OK why DID they want big increase in spending just then?) Now supporting JFK buildup (and military Keynesianism, against Ike's Humphreyism, and "massive retaliation only," for conventional buildup AND strategic buildup (like NSC-68, earlier Nitze).

Fear of "neutralism" in Saigon (McNamara, LBJ 134 Negotiated settlement, humiliating defeat (dom pol of 1950-53). Rostow in Feb. 64: "a credible threat to bomb the industry Hanoi had so painstakingly constructed out of the ruins of the French Indochina War would be enough to frighten the country's leaders into ordering the Vietcong to halt their activities in the South." 136

Yet both JFK and LBJ hold military spending down from what JCS want, and involvement, though keeping high level going and involvement.

But JS thinks that Tet in 1968 "signaled the recognition that containment Militarism had failed in southeast Asia" and from then on, only objective is to get out. NO: N had NOT given up on getting (troops) out with "honor," i.e. keeping Thieu in power (winning, as long as N was in office). Nuc were to be the key, madman strategy: though actually, he came close to achieving his goal WITHOUT the nuc threats having been effective, let only critical; he did it without those at all! (As if he hadn't made such threats! I'm not sure I ever recognized that before this moment.) His escalations weren't critical, nor his demonstrations of "madness." Just, obduracy: and ability to convince US public that he was on the way out.

Then, after VN causes break in Establishment support for CW (with McGovern nomination in 1972 causing rift;, and N goes "soft" with HAK on détente, ABM Treaty (SALT-I), just as he leaves (August 1974) beginning of CPD to form, combining Nitze (resigns July 1974, testifies against SALT-II in August 1974, and Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Foreign Policy Task Force under Eugene Rostow, , under-secretary of state under Johnson), formed after McGovern in 1972; (with Schlesinger support, though under Ford until fired in 1975 for opposing détente): anti-détente, anti-arms control, anti-SALT-I and II; pro-CW-II.

Anti-HAK! Who says: to Rostow (August 19, 1974: N just out): "We frankly see no evidence of a Soviet 'headlong drive for first-strike capability in both nuclear and

conventional arms' that the Task force position paper has claimed..." HAK has become like Bohlen and Kennan! Looking for a balance of interests with Soviets (and Chinese), traditional power politics, heresy to Rostow, believer in Soviet "insatiable expansionism." Balance of power approach, recognizing spheres of influence ("Sonnenfeld Doctrine"! 161) trade agreements; SALT. Anathema "CW over." BAH says CPD-II CPD !

; anti-Carter when he freezes them out (in favor of Trilateralists, stressing free trade instead of CW), pressure for third great arms buildup (after Truman and JFK), beginning under Carter 1979-80 but that can't reconcile them to him. Nitze simply sore (?) at being frozen out of Carter admin, along with rest of CPD, even as Carter came to begin to enact CPD program.

Neo-cons don't just join repubs, they join right-wing Repubs (who have become imperialist, no longer "isolationist" in any sense: anti-Soviet, not just anti-com (at home) or anti-Asian coms).

Then CPD-II in 1976 anti-Carter, pro-Reagan (really, third incarnation of anti-détente hawks, again stressing military threat from Soviets: "superiority," in strategic arms (not about to attack Europe, or anywhere); again "appearance" will erode US hegemony, lead to "neutralism," and "accommodation," exclude US from Europe (and Asia).

Nitze quits SALT delegation June 15, 1974 claiming he fears WG is causing N to concede too much (SU "superiority"—in ICBMs, megatonnage); testifies with Jackson against "myth of détente" on June 20. (Having lost chance to be ISA again under Schlesinger, having to do with impeachment politics, in March, 1974. (??) Schles fired in 1975. Thanksgiving 1975, discussion of forming CPD-II. Begin organizing March 1976 (election year); CPD launches Nov. 1 (?) 1976, immediate on Carter victory.

Pipes: Why SU believes it can fight and win nuclear war," Commentary, July 1977.

"...a country like the SU, which, as Soviet generals proudly boast, suffered in WWII the loss of over 20 million casualties...to win the war and emerge as a global power, is not to be intimidated by the prospect of destruction." [ANY level? Beyond AJW, twenty years later) SU believes in "limited nuclear confrontation," i.e., a DE-Kaufmann-like controlled central war (Nitze), blackmail based on this credible threat and capability.

(After Schles LSR, Jan. 74,,under Ford; and PD-59 under Carter/Brown in 1980, which Reagan takes over). Not essential equivalence (allowing asymmetries), no asymmetries (Carter carries over: parity, triad) in nuclear or conventional; arms buildup 167 new nucs, under Ford: carried over under Carter/Brown/Perry. "Modernization," to prevent "appearance" of Soviet ascendancy, "accommodation, neutralism, non-alignment . CPD April 4, 1977, What is the Soviet Union up to?": the Soviets "hope to profit from a growing perception in Western Europe of a decline in US will and power and a

concurrent illusion that the Soviet Threat has ended. This would bring about the fatal weakening of NATO and **help ease the US out of Europe.**"

168: CDM, For an adequate defense: "There is considerable feeling particularly in Europe, that the risks are not great (of Soviet aggression against Europe)." Ironically, then, the proposed military buildup was proffered not to deter the risk of war but **the risk of ending the cold war.** *Challenges to the empire from within* remained as intolerable in the post-Vietnam era as it had a quarter century before in 1950.

Nitze and Graham in 1977: US strategic superiority was critical in both Berlin and Cuba; and that superiority has slipped away.

[WAS this true? Cuba and Berlin would not even have arisen as crises if the balance had actually been reversed; but parity—which is what JFK and McN felt actually existed—would not have led to different results, even if it meant that positions had been symmetric, SU stronger and US weaker than they were).

166: In 1974? HAK had said: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" (quoted by Nitze, For Pol, 1974-75"Strategic Balance... p. 136.

As late as Jan. 77 (p. 261) HAK says: "I believe that to achieve a usable superiority in strategic weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts me." But he shifts in hearings on SALT-II in 1979, says he regrets earlier comment, said in a moment of "fatigue and exasperation."

Eventually, GWOT and "radical Islam" replace the Soviet Threat; although in the last year (2015) Russian threat is coming back, and insatiable Russian expansionism (Crimea! Ukraine! Syria!)

Friday, February 5, 2016

DE Comments on Sanders comments

[[1968: as SU was approaching US in numbers of ICBMs (about 1000?) McNamara expected them to stop (as they “should” have stopped at, say, 600—if not less—enough to make preemption impractical.) Instead, they went on to 1400—“more than they needed for deterrence”—which happened to be what McNamara had forecast for MM, at the time they started their buildup, 1964. (FK: CHECK dates]

But then, McNamara authorized MIRV, using the more accurate warheads! Absolutely assuring another round of the arms race: another story on the Domsday Machine! (As Rathjens and Ruina warned HAK in 1969). A looming threat to MM (especially with US MIRV!) by the more-MIRVed, larger and more numerous SU ICBMs! Almost surely avertible, by arms control agreement: always a better way to “limit damage” in a war (or avert the war) than “dynamic disarmament,” destroying missiles on the ground or in space (or limiting their effects by CD)!

Was the SU still the stand-in for Hitler, the arming opponent who couldn’t be “appeased” by an agreement that they would fulfill? Come on! There had been the PTB (and should have been CTB: if not for the Physics Division at RAND, a scandalous association for me, under Ike: Teller’s boys, the Latter brothers.

That would have prevented the accuracy improvements (no?) and MIRV, including on SLBMs: which kept CF (counterforce) alive (so to speak: risking all the rest of us. I.e., kept the Air Force in the strategic warfare business, against the Navy; kept Lockheed, Martin, Boeing, etc. in that business, with their donations and votes and jobs and union support; made FU threats still “viable,” though against VN (Nixon, VN) FS wasn’t really needed for that, or much, even though the SU supported NVN (not to the point, I don’t think, of joining the US anti-war and anti-nuclear movement in reacting to US FU by threats or implementation of SU nuclear threats, even LSR (limited strategic retaliation).

Another fatal “compromise” for McNamara (to avoid having to fight off their demands for more MM (Minuteman): for what? To match the SU?

To avert (if they ever even considered the possibility) of at last educating the US public, Congress and the world, to the simple realities of nuclear “warfare,” i.e. suicidal, omnicidal, or at the least genocidal threats and commitments. CANDOR at last! Never attempted to this day by any leaders of any NWS: or for that matter, the leaders of any NNWS, or the UN (except, for the General Assembly, to condemn FU, without any specifics or analysis).

{ from earlier comments: 267 [If Carter had tried to enlist a popular base—possible after VN/N—against militarism, as he seemed privately to want to do (see his campaign pledges, and initial proposals to JCS and even to SU)—that would raised

opposition to empire as well. For what reason empire if not to defend against SU? , SU threat was needed for US hegemony in Europe and in TW. Managerialists of empire, like Trilaterals (Carter: but also, in particular, Brz) wanted less emphasis on military means (did Brz?) but also empire; international economics plan to shift division of labor, shifting older sectors of industrial manufacturing to South from North.}

Thus, the same year the US was endorsing the NPT, calling for disarmament, McNamara and LBJ were sponsoring a development, MIRV, that would result in tripling the number of US and SU warheads, leading to a high of almost 80,000 in the early 80's (an earlier high in 1967) (CHECK). Double-Doomsday Machines, several in each superpower.

p. 12: How did an H-bomb lead to preserving "atomic diplomacy" (as in Europe)? (Who was the first, by weeks, to drop a half-megaton bomb? The George test¹ 8 May 1951 (225 KT) was before the SU test of a droppable "hydrogen" bomb (really, a boosted fission weapon), August 12, 1953 (announced by Malenkov August 8, 1953, our anniversary).²

¹ 5-8-51 The (Greenhouse series) *George* explosion was the world's first thermonuclear burn, though it was just a test design, unsuitable for weaponization. Shaped like a torus, the *George* device had a small amount of heavy isotopes of liquid hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) placed at its center. The vast majority of its yield derived from fission. The energy output from the thermonuclear fusion in this test was insignificant in comparison. The "George" device was more like a "boosted" atomic bomb than a thermonuclear one. The small amount of heavy deuterium and tritium in this test fused, but its role was to generate a strong flurry of fast neutrons - ones that sparked more fissions in the uranium nuclei that were present, and which also caused fission in uranium-238 - which does not fission under bombardment with slow neutrons, as does uranium-235.

The *George* design was a 'Classical Super' prototype with a binary triggering device using radiation implosion upon a cylinder. The design of the triggering system in this test was based on the one patented by Klaus Fuchs and von Neumann in 1946.^[1] Its success played a vital role in the History of the Teller-Ulam design.

The *George* test validated the principles which would be used for the first full-scale thermonuclear bomb test, *Ivy Mike*, one year later, on 1 November 1952, at Enewetak Atoll. *Item* was the first boosted fission weapon, nearly doubling the normal yield of a similar non-boosted weapon.

² RDS-6 (Joe-4)

A little less than a year after the United States tested its first thermonuclear device with the Mike Shot on November 1, 1952, the Soviets tested their own thermonuclear bomb. On August 8, 1953, Soviet Premier Georgy Malenkov announced that the United States no longer had a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb. Four days later, on August 12, 1953, the first test of a Soviet thermonuclear device took place.

The test, which became known as Joe-4 (this had been the fourth Soviet nuclear explosion whose occurrence was announced by the United States), took place at the Semipalatinsk test site and yielded roughly 400 kilotons of TNT.

Ted Taylor's SOB (Super-Oralloy Bomb) of 500 KT was air-dropped November 16, 1952 (two weeks after Mike, H-device).³ So a half-MT device was air-deliverable prior to H-bomb: but it used 60kg of HEU (much more expensive than H?).

With "nuclear plenty" (fission: when? 1952?) large numbers of bombs were feasible; but with H, large numbers of very large bombs (not needed: except for ICBMs) became feasible, especially "cheaply" (lower use of HEU and Pu). So? Already, nuc winter was attainable, by A-bombs alone, several hundred, no? The numbers in the SAC war plan, before H. If you wanted it, which you didn't. The war plans proceeded to expand for forty years (!) 1945-1983, in ignorance of the smoke effect and the nuclear firestorms (so sought after in WWII! TELL)

But with a two-sided nuclear exchange, even fission, you had Doomsday for Eurasia: from mid-Fifties. (Again, NATO planning was set, and the US nuclear component which gave the US a unique "protectorate" role (actually, mutual suicide inducer, even with A-bombs) for Europe, before the prospect of two-sided war was clear. (Though it **should** have been seen as inevitable, soon! Was it, or not?)

Were European leaders (and publics: almost surely kept in the dark by their leaders) really in the spirit of Castro: "Better (certainty of) annihilation before imminent occupation"? Societal Samson option? ("Open the floodgates, the dikes"; what are other metaphors, precedents, if any? This is what (two-sided) nuclear "defense" offered Europe! (provided courtesy of the US: though German bombs could have done it on a more limited scale, if they had been allowed. No, "arm Germany" in 1947—"no problem," two years after WWII—but "no nuclears.")

p. 20. True that "perception" of power affects relationships and prospects/options in crises. But the White House has a great ability to affect those "perceptions"—IF it ever chose CANDOR. (Or could it? That's what presidents are doubtful of: especially in the face of well-funded contradictions by the MIC, Oil, the military.) McNamara tried to do that, with Athens/Ann Arbor, for the allies, wrt my own coercive strategy: and failed miserably.

³ The Ivy King bomb, designated as a Mk-18 bomb and named the "Super Oralloy Bomb", was a modified version of the Mk-6D bomb. Instead of using an implosion system similar to the Mk-6D, it used a 92-point implosion system initially developed for the Mk-13. Its uranium-plutonium core was replaced by 60 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fashioned into a thin-walled sphere equivalent to approximately four critical masses. The thin-walled sphere was a commonly used design, which ensured that the fissile material remained sub-critical until imploded. The HEU sphere was then enclosed in a natural-uranium neutron reflector. To physically prevent the HEU sphere collapsing into a critical condition if the surrounding explosives were detonated accidentally, or if the sphere was crushed following an aircraft accident, the hollow center was filled with a chain made from aluminum and boron, which was pulled out to arm the bomb. The boron-coated chain also absorbed the neutrons needed to drive the nuclear reaction.

NSC-68 (1950) aimed at roll-back, partly with nuclear threats, as did Truman/Byrnes initially with Hiroshima (and Stimson, Churchill): total failure. Likewise Ike. And Reagan! (And Nixon: roll-back of NVA in SVN, back to DRV! Failure!) JFK: roll-back of Castro in Cuba, with conventional force (not threats), under shadow of nuclear threats to prevent SU "horizontal escalation" to Turkey or Berlin (initially, before crisis, not even expecting the necessity of the latter threats, and denying their role even during and after the crisis, to the frustration of the JCS): failure. LBJ, likewise in SVN, conventional force: failure (as in Korea, no more than a stalemate achieved).

Reagan called for an increase in the defense budget in the absence of any Communist advance or crisis (like NSC-68 before Korea: which was withheld from public discussion. See PNAC before 9-11). Just to close "window of vulnerability" (which hinted at a possible SU FS, but really referred to a reduced ability of the US to make credible FU threats: which, really, were no longer needed against SU, and SU was about to expire, which Reagan even foresaw!).

So what was it about, Nitze's CPD-II? Really, out-spending SU? To the profit of the MIC? (Was Nitze into either of those: pressing the SU to go bankrupt, or profiting the MIC? AJW may have been into the latter by that time. DID Reagan ever really take nuclear war lightly, as he seemed to be rhetorically? We believed that at the time, but it was put into question by Reykjavik, and even SDI as Reagan understood it, and later revelations about Reagan. So—what was that rhetoric about?

And Team B?! And Coalition for a Democratic Majority (anti-McGovern and peace movement in Dem Party). What are "humanitarian interventionists" about, really? (Their base).

What was it they wanted that they weren't getting from the administration (starting under GHWB and HAK: détente)? What did détente and an end to anti-SU put in their way? Big arms buildup? Military Keynesianism? (Was there a recession?) They no longer needed to get dollars to Europe, or offshore procurement, right?

{The political base for CPD II was in the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a group formed in 1972 by the hard-line, anti-Soviet wing of the Senate, led by Sen. Henry M. Scoop Jackson. These conservative Democrats contended that communism was a great evil and that the U.S. had a moral obligation to eradicate it and foster democracy throughout the world. The 193 individual members of the revitalized CPD comprise a who's who of the Democratic Party establishment and a cross-section of Republican leadership.

{ CPD II broadened its base considerably from the original group by including in its ranks top labor officials, Jewish liberals and neo-conservative intellectuals. It managed this feat by including in its ideology not only a strong anti-Soviet policy, but also one which promoted **growth and expansion**. These members donate their time to the organization. **The CPD presented an alternative to the cooperative**

vision of empire put forth by the Trilateralists with an imperial, unilateral philosophy of power retention through military strength. President James Earl Carter, Jr. chose to follow the philosophy of the Trilaterals, but the CPD and its cohorts became dominant with the election of Ronald Reagan. (See Trilateral Commission.)

"Other proponents of the CPD position include the American Security Council (ASC), the ASC's Congressional lobby group--the National Coalition for Peace through Strength."

"Advocate of nuclear superiority, the CPD helped to create **the myth of U.S. nuclear inferiority and the concept of 'windows of vulnerability.'** CPD has expressed longstanding opposition to all types of arms control. Founding member William R. Van Cleave said, 'Arms control has had a depressant effect not only on our military programs but also on our ability to deal with the Soviets. It has thoroughly muddled our thinking.'"

So, a split in the Ruling Class. (Like ? "little Englanders" or proponents of indirect empire, in 19th century, vs. "imperialists"?) But why was Brzezinski with the Trilaterals? (Was he really in-between? Why was David Rockefeller a Trilateralist, or again, was he really inbetween? Were either of them against an arms buildup? (Brz was for MX, and decap.)

What was the financial/industrial (electronics, aerospace) back for the two groups? CPD-II: David Packard of Hewlett-Packard, Scaife of Gulf Oil. Rumsfeld first major backer of MX (but that's under Carter, no? Or Schlesinger, originally? Why did "fanatic anti-communists" (like me, earlier!—before VN/PP) Jackson Democrat!) want arms buildup, really? Where was it "necessary" to oppose SU and Coms? Horn of Africa? (Brz). Nicaragua? El Salvador? Who but Reagan was concerned about latter?

Carter gave in to this, but not enthusiastically enough (or with a big enough budget). He and they sacrificed any hope of reducing or dismantling (Carter's first hope) the Doomsday Machine!

Who really believed that SU was preparing for "nuclear blackmail"? What was "nuclear superiority" of US going to do for us, in Eighties? (It was hardly needed for superpower influence after the fall of the SU, which Reagan was aiming at!)

GWB pushed this line in office, "crusading—madman—school of right-wing foreign policy," but not in his campaign (on the contrary: if anything, I heard it more from Gore's "humanitarian intervention," Fuerth's suspicion of SU and solicitude for the MIC). But isn't Trump (and others) reaching for this cachet: even McCain is a loser/coward for him! (prisoner, not hero!) "Win, win, win." Win, baby, win. (Cruz: carpet-bomber).

So we're doing 2000 over again (vs. Clinton), which was a remake of 1976-80, which was a remake of 1960-61 (fallout shelters! Missile gap! Ready to risk nuclear war if necessary, Berlin and Cuba) Buildup of MM) (I was part of that!) which was a remake of 1950 (which was just as "paranoid delusional" as all the remakes, although drawing on the supposed set-backs and dangers of: "loss of China", Hiss, Fuchs, (McCarthy/Taft: domestic communists), Korea, Chinese entry, above all Soviet A-bomb (so? Inevitable, right on scientists' schedule, following US precedent of Trinity (not of Hiroshima! Or firebombing! Just four years earlier, against our new ally—along with Germany—Japan). (

1970 is missing in this sequence: though in 1969 Nixon actually intended to drop nuclear weapons, but only as a fait accompli, no campaigning or publicizing this (except to Republicans at nominating convention in 1968); instead, he goes for arms control (along with MIRV!) to neutralize SU and China to

allow him to escalate conventional bombing of VN!) Also, 1990 is missing: SU is imploding: chance for really dismantling DM (and a hidden nuclear crisis in SU in 1991: but missed because...? 2010?

Perle: winnable nuclear war under Reagan (check); Wolfowitz, nuclear weapons in Persian Gulf war (AJW?); Haig as "too moderate" (following HAK!); "Lessons of 1980:

Back to 1950: US troops to Europe as "tripwire" (see my lectures, 1959, on "plate glass window" confronting Hitler in Czechoslovakia: the "perfectly intelligent detonator." Conrad's "Secret Agent." The "character" that Nixon thought Ike had but he lacked.

What if **MacArthur had not** (with support of the JCS) brought the Chinese in? (Because he really didn't believe they would: or because he hoped they would, or was ready to risk it, ambivalently: to get a chance to use nucs and unleash Chinats?) A clear case of "provocation": was it intended, or not? (Was August 2, 1964, intended or not? I still don't know.) How would the world be different?

My section man, Conant, wanted at least the credible threat of FU (as well as the demonstration to the world of Hiroshima; but that wasn't merely to support his claim to remain head of Harvard, despite his wartime absence, though that was why he was happy at Hiroshima). Thus, his concern about Hersey, and encouragement of Stimson (Bundy) article in Harper's. And UMT/draft (like Nitze, he wanted ground troops as well as nucs: why, in his case?) "mobilization": cold war mood. WHY CONANT? (And all other major university heads? Ass-holes.)

Our homes "in great danger." Present danger. (Like, terror, 9-11 — ISIS).

Another, earlier split in Ruling Class, in 1950 (the same one as before WWII: "isolationists" vs. "internationalists" (Anglophiles...)) What industrial/financial basis for these groups? Why did Hoover/Taft wing lose? Was that inevitable, in 1950-52? (Dems lost 28 seats in House, but controlled (with southerners), 229-194 or something)/ (Dems had 60-% of House vote in 1948, up by 75 seats. In presidential campaign, Wallace got a little less than Thurmond, together almost 5%; Truman 49% to Dewey 45%)